| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Adam Bales |
| Abstract | Abstract Some people believe that advanced artificial intelligence systems (AIs) might, in the future, come to have moral status. Further, humans might be tempted to design such AIs that they serve us, carrying out tasks that make our lives better. This raises the question of whether designing AIs with moral status to be willing servants would problematically violate their autonomy. In this paper, I argue that it would in fact do so. |
| Date | 2025-03-31 |
| Language | en |
| Short Title | Against willing servitude |
| Library Catalog | DOI.org (Crossref) |
| URL | https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqaf031/8100849 |
| Accessed | 6/11/2025, 1:12:59 PM |
| Rights | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| Pages | pqaf031 |
| Publication | The Philosophical Quarterly |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaf031 |
| ISSN | 0031-8094, 1467-9213 |
| Date Added | 6/11/2025, 1:12:59 PM |
| Modified | 6/11/2025, 1:12:59 PM |
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Rachael L Brown |
| Author | Robert C Brooks |
| Date | 2025-05-26 |
| Language | en |
| Short Title | Smartphones |
| Library Catalog | DOI.org (Crossref) |
| URL | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2025.2504070 |
| Accessed | 6/10/2025, 12:58:18 PM |
| Pages | 1-16 |
| Publication | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2025.2504070 |
| Journal Abbr | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| ISSN | 0004-8402, 1471-6828 |
| Date Added | 6/10/2025, 12:58:18 PM |
| Modified | 6/10/2025, 12:58:18 PM |
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Sean Donahue |
| Abstract | Epistocracy is rule by whoever is more likely to make correct decisions. AI epistocracy is rule by an artificial intelligence that is more likely to make correct decisions than any humans, individually or collectively. I argue that although various objections have been raised against epistocracy, the most popular do not apply to epistocracy organized around AI rule. I use this result to show that epistocracy is fundamentally flawed because none of its forms provide adequate opportunity for people (as opposed to individuals) to develop a record of meaningful moral achievement. This Collective Moral Achievement Objection provides a novel reason to value democracy. It also provides guidance on how we ought to incorporate digital technologies into politics, regardless of how proficient these technologies may become at identifying correct decisions. |
| Date | 2025-06-01 |
| Language | en |
| Library Catalog | Springer Link |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-024-02175-9 |
| Accessed | 6/13/2025, 9:07:27 AM |
| Volume | 40 |
| Pages | 4105-4117 |
| Publication | AI & SOCIETY |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00146-024-02175-9 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Journal Abbr | AI & Soc |
| ISSN | 1435-5655 |
| Date Added | 6/13/2025, 9:07:27 AM |
| Modified | 6/13/2025, 9:07:30 AM |
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Amitai Etzioni |
| Author | Oren Etzioni |
| Abstract | The growing number of ‘smart’ instruments, those equipped with AI, has raised concerns because these instruments make autonomous decisions; that is, they act beyond the guidelines provided them by programmers. Hence, the question the makers and users of smart instrument (e.g., driver-less cars) face is how to ensure that these instruments will not engage in unethical conduct (not to be conflated with illegal conduct). The article suggests that to proceed we need a new kind of AI program—oversight programs—that will monitor, audit, and hold operational AI programs accountable. |
| Date | 2016-06-01 |
| Language | en |
| Library Catalog | Springer Link |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-016-9400-6 |
| Accessed | 6/13/2025, 10:43:46 AM |
| Volume | 18 |
| Pages | 149-156 |
| Publication | Ethics and Information Technology |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10676-016-9400-6 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Journal Abbr | Ethics Inf Technol |
| ISSN | 1572-8439 |
| Date Added | 6/13/2025, 10:43:46 AM |
| Modified | 6/13/2025, 10:43:48 AM |
| Item Type | Preprint |
|---|---|
| Author | Philipp Koralus |
| Abstract | In the face of rapidly advancing AI technology, individuals will increasingly rely on AI agents to navigate life's growing complexities, raising critical concerns about maintaining both human agency and autonomy. This paper addresses a fundamental dilemma posed by AI decision-support systems: the risk of either becoming overwhelmed by complex decisions, thus losing agency, or having autonomy compromised by externally controlled choice architectures reminiscent of ``nudging'' practices. While the ``nudge'' framework, based on the use of choice-framing to guide individuals toward presumed beneficial outcomes, initially appeared to preserve liberty, at AI-driven scale, it threatens to erode autonomy. To counteract this risk, the paper proposes a philosophic turn in AI design. AI should be constructed to facilitate decentralized truth-seeking and open-ended inquiry, mirroring the Socratic method of philosophical dialogue. By promoting individual and collective adaptive learning, such AI systems would empower users to maintain control over their judgments, augmenting their agency without undermining autonomy. The paper concludes by outlining essential features for autonomy-preserving AI systems, sketching a path toward AI systems that enhance human judgment rather than undermine it. |
| Date | 2025-04-24 |
| Short Title | The Philosophic Turn for AI Agents |
| Library Catalog | arXiv.org |
| URL | http://arxiv.org/abs/2504.18601 |
| Accessed | 6/10/2025, 1:00:32 PM |
| Extra | arXiv:2504.18601 [cs] |
| DOI | 10.48550/arXiv.2504.18601 |
| Repository | arXiv |
| Archive ID | arXiv:2504.18601 |
| Date Added | 6/10/2025, 1:00:32 PM |
| Modified | 6/10/2025, 1:00:33 PM |
| Item Type | Book |
|---|---|
| Author | Travis LaCroix |
| Date | 2025 |
| Language | eng |
| Short Title | Artificial Intelligence and the Value Alignment Problem |
| Library Catalog | K10plus ISBN |
| Place | Peterborough |
| Publisher | Broadview Press Ltd |
| ISBN | 978-1-55481-629-3 |
| # of Pages | 340 |
| Date Added | 6/11/2025, 1:13:58 PM |
| Modified | 6/11/2025, 1:13:58 PM |
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Travis LaCroix |
| Author | Alexandra Sasha Luccioni |
| Abstract | Benchmarks are seen as the cornerstone for measuring technical progress in artificial intelligence (AI) research and have been developed for a variety of tasks ranging from question answering to emotion recognition. An increasingly prominent research area in AI is ethics, which currently has no set of benchmarks nor commonly accepted way for measuring the ‘ethicality’ of an AI system. In this paper, drawing upon research in moral philosophy and metaethics, we argue that it is impossible to develop such a benchmark. As such, alternative mechanisms are necessary for evaluating whether an AI system is ‘ethical’. This is especially pressing in light of the prevalence of applied, industrial AI research. We argue that it makes more sense to talk about ‘values’ (and ‘value alignment’) rather than ‘ethics’ when considering the possible actions of present and future AI systems. We further highlight that, because values are unambiguously relative, focusing on values forces us to consider explicitly what the values are and whose values they are. Shifting the emphasis from ethics to values therefore gives rise to several new ways of understanding how researchers might advance research programmes for robustly safe or beneficial AI. |
| Date | 2025-03-19 |
| Language | en |
| Library Catalog | Springer Link |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-025-00703-x |
| Accessed | 6/11/2025, 1:14:49 PM |
| Publication | AI and Ethics |
| DOI | 10.1007/s43681-025-00703-x |
| Journal Abbr | AI Ethics |
| ISSN | 2730-5961 |
| Date Added | 6/11/2025, 1:14:49 PM |
| Modified | 6/11/2025, 1:14:49 PM |
| Item Type | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Author | N. G. Laskowski |
| Editor | Henry Shevlin |
| Library Catalog | PhilPapers |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Book Title | AI in Society: Relationships (Oxford Intersections) |
| Date Added | 6/11/2025, 9:27:40 PM |
| Modified | 6/11/2025, 9:27:40 PM |
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Robert Long |
| Author | Jeff Sebo |
| Author | Toni Sims |
| Abstract | The field of AI safety considers whether and how AI development can be safe and beneficial for humans and other animals, and the field of AI welfare considers whether and how AI development can be safe and beneficial for AI systems. There is a prima facie tension between these projects, since some measures in AI safety, if deployed against humans and other animals, would raise questions about the ethics of constraint, deception, surveillance, alteration, suffering, death, disenfranchisement, and more. Is there in fact a tension between these projects? We argue that, considering all relevant factors, there is indeed a moderately strong tension—and it deserves more examination. In particular, we should devise interventions that can promote both safety and welfare where possible, and prepare frameworks for navigating any remaining tensions thoughtfully. |
| Date | 2025-05-23 |
| Language | en |
| Library Catalog | Springer Link |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02302-2 |
| Accessed | 6/11/2025, 1:11:30 PM |
| Publication | Philosophical Studies |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-025-02302-2 |
| Journal Abbr | Philos Stud |
| ISSN | 1573-0883 |
| Date Added | 6/11/2025, 1:11:30 PM |
| Modified | 6/11/2025, 1:11:30 PM |
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Raphaël Millière |
| Abstract | The progress of AI systems such as large language models (LLMs) raises increasingly pressing concerns about their safe deployment. This paper examines the value alignment problem for LLMs, arguing that current alignment strategies are fundamentally inadequate to prevent misuse. Despite ongoing efforts to instill norms such as helpfulness, honesty, and harmlessness in LLMs through fine-tuning based on human preferences, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks that exploit conflicts between these norms. I argue that this vulnerability reflects a fundamental limitation of existing alignment methods: they reinforce shallow behavioral dispositions rather than endowing LLMs with a genuine capacity for normative deliberation. Drawing from on research in moral psychology, I show how humans’ ability to engage in deliberative reasoning enhances their resilience against similar adversarial tactics. LLMs, by contrast, lack a robust capacity to detect and rationally resolve normative conflicts, leaving them susceptible to manipulation; even recent advances in reasoning-focused LLMs have not addressed this vulnerability. This “shallow alignment” problem carries significant implications for AI safety and regulation, suggesting that current approaches are insufficient for mitigating potential harms posed by increasingly capable AI systems. |
| Date | 2025-05-27 |
| Language | en |
| Library Catalog | Springer Link |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02347-3 |
| Accessed | 6/11/2025, 1:11:25 PM |
| Publication | Philosophical Studies |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-025-02347-3 |
| Journal Abbr | Philos Stud |
| ISSN | 1573-0883 |
| Date Added | 6/11/2025, 1:11:28 PM |
| Modified | 6/11/2025, 1:11:28 PM |